



Discussion Report Talking ASEAN Webinar

on

An Intervention to Indonesia's ASEAN Chairmanship:
The 42nd ASEAN Summit and Its Implications for
Regional Stability and Order

Jakarta, May 19th 2023



Introduction

The Habibie Center (THC) convened the 1st Talking ASEAN Webinar on 19 May 2023. Entitled **“An Intervention to Indonesia’s ASEAN Chairmanship: The 42nd ASEAN Summit and Its Implications for Regional Stability and Order,”** the webinar invited three speakers—**Lina A. Alexandra** (Head of Department of International Relations, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Indonesia), **Teuku Rezasyah** (Lecturer, Department of International Relations, Universitas Padjadjaran), **Makarim Wibisono** (Professor, The Republic of Indonesia Defense University),—and was moderated by **Luthfy Ramiz** (Researcher of ASEAN Studies Program, The Habibie Center).


The objectives of the webinar were to: (a) comprehend the results of the 42nd ASEAN Summit and their implications for regional stability and order; (b) situate the 42nd ASEAN Summit within recent geopolitical developments around Southeast Asia; and (c) assess Indonesia’s capacity and leadership as an ASEAN Chair.

This discussion report summarized the key points of each speaker, as well as the following questions and answers session.

PRESENTATION FROM THE PANELIST



Teuku Rezasyah
(Lecturer, Department of International
Relations, Universitas Padjadjaran)



Makarim Wibisono began his presentation by evaluating the 42nd ASEAN Summit, as the public had high expectations toward the outcomes. Many people were seeking a solution for Myanmar as the problem created many questions and predictions, eventually complexifying the situation. Besides the Myanmar issue, the creation of concepts established in the Indo-Pacific region, including Quad, AUKUS, and Five Eyes, necessitated ASEAN to manage the situation through cooperation rather than rivalry in the area. Moreover, Wibisono highlighted that the South China Sea was still in high tension, so the Summit was expected to bring ideas to mitigate the tension in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. These issues were very much under public scrutiny, and it was interesting to see whether the heads of the ASEAN countries could gauge the trend in the future regarding the possible solutions to the problems.

Amidst high expectations on the summit that had yet to be fulfilled, Wibisono assessed that the Summit ran well and some progress had been made in terms of practical issues in ASEAN—such as positive outcome on Timor Leste’s accession to ASEAN, the establishment of ASEAN villages network, the development of a regional electric vehicle ecosystem, and the local currency transition.

Whereas the situation became more complex in Myanmar, Wibisono also shared his view on the crisis. He argued that there had been a lack of discussion among the parties involved in the conflict, which was difficult to trace during the military junta’s control. If ASEAN could not resolve the Myanmar Crisis, the image of ASEAN among external powers would be critical. ASEAN could create an atmosphere that would induce a multi-parties dialogue and eventually lead towards a solution that might be sufficient for all parties. The main issues were the absence of materialization of the Five-Points Consensus (5PC) and limits to the special envoy’s work within a one-year chairmanship.

ASEAN would need a far-reaching and sustainable approach as there had been doubts about whether quiet diplomacy would not be concluded with the end of Indonesia’s chairmanship. For instance, ASEAN should consider changing the special envoy to the Chair—which rotates every year—to the special envoy to ASEAN and involving Troika. Through the Troika, the previous, current, and future chairs can play a collective role to create a sustainable approach to Myanmar. ASEAN can also utilize the role of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), military actors, and engage with non-governmental organizations. ASEAN must use both first-track and second-track approaches to seek solutions for Myanmar. In addition, ASEAN mechanisms need to be more responsive to immediate challenges like the Myanmar Crisis. Since the capacity had not been maximized as

an actor in ASEAN, the group could give more chances to the ASEAN Secretary-General to be more active in implementing decisions taken by the leaders.

Wibisono also touched on the integration of a new ASEAN member, Timor Leste. From a geopolitical perspective, Timor Leste could be regarded as a part of Southeast Asia, and it would be ideal if all Southeast Asia countries were part of ASEAN. Despite the economic situation in Timor Leste being far less affluent compared to other ASEAN member states, he believed that with support from all ASEAN members, ASEAN could assist Timor Leste in

the process towards full membership.

Moving to the dynamics beyond ASEAN, Wibisono expressed that the Taiwan Strait issue had been a part of the US and China rivalry. When there was pressure from the US towards China, China addressed the Taiwan issue immediately. The issue had been manageable for China because of its proximity to Taiwan, and it would not be a big problem for China because many cards could be played. In Taiwan itself, there had been a political party that favored China. Hence, many opportunities could be utilized by Beijing. If the US kept putting pressure on Beijing, Beijing would bring the Taiwan issue to the international forum. Wibisono emphasized that ASEAN should discuss intensely and prepare a clear position on the issue if something would happen in the future.

PRESENTATION FROM THE PANELIST



Makarim Wibisono
(Professor, The Republic of
Indonesia Defense University))



Teuku Rezasyah shed light on regional political dynamics, particularly on the Myanmar issue, the accession of Timor Leste into ASEAN, and the Post-2025 ASEAN Vision. Rezasyah argued that the Myanmar crisis overshadowed the ASEAN Summit and the member countries were dissatisfied to witness Myanmar's lack of progress in accomplishing the 5PC. Amidst the lack of commitment from Myanmar's side towards implementing the consensus, ASEAN countries were also reluctant to challenge the principle of non-interference in fellow members' domestic affairs—a defining principle of ASEAN. There were diverse statements made by individual ASEAN leaders on the issue of human rights violations and the Rohingya Crisis. Although Burmese political leaders have been excluded from ASEAN meetings, some of the group's member countries wanted to engage with Myanmar's military junta.

Touching upon the institutional structure of ASEAN, Rezasyah expressed his criticism of the ASEAN Charter. He emphasized that ASEAN must improve the qualities of the charter in order to make it more efficient, effective, and operable—*ergo*, a consultation with all of the ASEAN members concerning the problem would be necessary. ASEAN would need to empower the Secretary-General to have the capacity in tackling specific issues and the ASEAN members must be aware that the Secretary-General position represents ASEAN, not a certain ASEAN country. Rezasyah stressed that, despite the complexity of the Myanmar issue that ASEAN faced, it might

not be ASEAN's biggest hurdle. He proposed that bringing along soft issues, for instance, initiating cooperation with external partners—such as Australia, New Zealand, Denmark, or Sweden—could provide the framework to approach Myanmar.

Rezasyah sees ASEAN as having little influence on Myanmar's military government. Despite being seen as a re-iteration of the 5PC, President Joko Widodo's strong statements could be considered as important. His speech highlighted the idea of maintaining the Myanmar issue on the table and exhibiting ASEAN solidarity in helping find a way to stimulate progress in Myanmar together with Burmese authorities. Under its chairmanship, Indonesia proposed six approaches to manage the issue, such as (1) the implementation of the 5PC remained the primary reference for the ASEAN in helping Myanmar; (2) the urgency to stop violence in order to create a conducive situation in Myanmar immediately; (3) a plan for assigning the Secretary-General of ASEAN and the AHA Center to continue to seek access so that the Comprehensive Needs Assessment can be completed immediately; (4) the decision on non-political representation from Myanmar must also be implemented; (5) the ASEAN engagement with all Myanmar stakeholders must be carried out immediately to facilitate the national dialogue; and (6) to respect the principle of non-interference, ASEAN would not provide support for elections that are not inclusive and are not prepared based on national dialogue. In the end, Rezasyah conveyed his hope for Myanmar to become



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What are the key takeaways noted from the 42nd ASEAN Summit?

2. ASEAN in extra-regional dynamics, particularly Cross-Strait issues;

- (1) PRC remains at the upper hand before and after the Summit, while ASEAN continued to work hard to garner internal cohesiveness.
- (2) PRC gained greater confidence following the failed US and NATO attempt to end Russian war in Ukraine, continued with Russian greater connection with PRC through BRICS and SCO. Since then, PRC continues to projecting its muscles in its vicinities such as the South China Sea and its sea borders with Taiwan and member countries of ASEAN.
- (3) The situation will continue to bring headaches to countries inside ASEAN, as ASEAN's one China policy has to anticipate a situation such as open conflicts involving the United States, which will not only produce unpredictable consequences, and also derail the region's economic growth and stability.
- (4) Therefore, with regard to Cross-Strait issues involving China and Taiwan, ASEAN policies remain normative.


a more democratic, international-law, and human-rights-respecting country.

With regard to the Post-2025 ASEAN Vision, Rezasyah specifically discussed the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). ASEAN Economic Community by 2025 shall be highly integrated and cohesive, competitive, innovative, and dynamic with enhanced connectivity and sectoral cooperation as well as a more resilient, inclusive, and people-oriented, people-centered community integrated with the global economy. Even though the Summit produced a strong statement to achieve the above-mentioned goals, ASEAN had not fully linked the ideas with the already designed Roadmap. Insufficient discussions were given to ASEAN's vulnerability to external shocks (G7 group and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership), which may render ASEAN less

relevant. Particular sectors would need to be highlighted—such as intra-regional trade and investment, unemployment and economic recession, labor mobility, climate change, and water scarcity—to increase ASEAN intra-regional cooperation.

In terms of its accession to ASEAN, Timor Leste must follow 66 ASEAN Agreements as part of the process of becoming a full ASEAN member. Hence, Indonesia and other ASEAN countries must take a role to assist Timor Leste to speed up its ASEAN full membership in line with the proposed roadmap. ASEAN and ASEAN Dialogue Partners should work together to empower Timor Leste and provide capacity-building programs.

Subsequently, Rezasyah also highlighted extra-regional dynamics—Cross-Strait issues






in particular. While ASEAN continued to work hard to garner international cohesiveness, China still had the upper hand before and after the Summit. China gained greater confidence following the failed US and NATO's attempt to end the Russian war in Ukraine, which continued with Russian greater connection with China through Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Since then, China had continued to project its power in its vicinities, such as the South China Sea and its maritime borders with Taiwan and ASEAN member states. The situation would continue to exacerbate concerns for countries inside ASEAN, as ASEAN's One China Policy would have to anticipate situations such as open conflicts involving the US, which would produce unpredictable consequences and derail the region's economic growth and stability. Therefore, ASEAN policies remain normative in response to Cross-Strait issues involving China and Taiwan.

In gauging Indonesia's performance as the ASEAN Chair, Rezasyah voiced that the successful conduct of the Summit received high appreciation from the top leaders of the ASEAN member countries, so this development had raised ASEAN's status internationally. It also raised the credibility of the Indonesian administration inside and outside the country and produced a strong point for President Joko Widodo in the final year of his second administration. Moreover, the Summit garnered internal cohesiveness and mutual understanding inside ASEAN. It would reach

momentum at the 43rd Summit, where top leaders of the world would be expected to come and discuss strategic issues such as the South China Sea and the ASEAN Vision on Indo-Pacific. As the Summit reached common ground on the issue of Human Trafficking and the use of electricity for future development, this topic would attract support from inside and outside ASEAN.

To sum up, Rezasyah suggested that Indonesia would need to table ideas that maintain ASEAN relevance and put ASEAN at the center of gravity in the Indo-Pacific and the world. Prior to that, Indonesia must convince the world that the nation would remain stable, secure, developing, and prospering, despite facing domestic hiccups due to the upcoming nationwide parliamentary and presidential elections.




Various issues could be taken into consideration for the next Summit, such as: (1) supporting ASEAN in achieving most Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) targets in 2030 and improving individual members in the following areas: demographic changes, uneven social development, good governance, economic gap, post-pandemic implications, and environmental degradation; (2) speeding up Timor Leste for ASEAN full membership in line with the already proposed roadmap; (3) implementing the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-

Pacific (AOIP), focusing on critical ideas such as freedom of navigation, freedom of flight, unimpeded lawful commerce, and peaceful resolutions of disputes across the South China Sea, prior to ASEAN chairmanship rotating to Laos in 2024; (4) looking for broader support to achieving two ASEAN declarations on EV and the protection of migrant workers; and (5) approaching China to jointly producing a joint statement prior to finalizing ASEAN-China South China Sea Code of Conduct.

PRESENTATION FROM THE PANELIST



Lina A. Alexandra
(Head of Department of
International Relations,
Centre for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) Indonesia)



Lina A. Alexandra shared her views on the 42nd ASEAN Summit by questioning ASEAN's moving toward its self-destruction. She divided her presentation into three sections, namely key takeaways from the Summit, Indonesia's capability in chairing ASEAN, and suggestions for Indonesia and ASEAN for the next Summit. In the key takeaways from the Summit, she shed light on the Myanmar Crisis as there had been insignificant progress on the implementation of the 5PC. ASEAN had not managed to get the junta to comply with the 5PC as violence continued, such as airstrikes and an attack on the humanitarian convoy on 7 May, a few days before the Summit.

Indonesia tried to address the Myanmar Crisis by using quiet diplomacy and establishing the Office of the Special Envoy. Through quiet diplomacy, although Indonesia had engaged with more stakeholders in Myanmar, the result was insignificant, as there was no ceasefire or implementation plan. Engagement with all stakeholders was the basic approach to building the implementation plan. Thus, Indonesia had to create a sustainable approach by issuing an implementation plan and institutionalizing the Office of the Special Envoy. Kicking Myanmar out of ASEAN would not be a solution, but ASEAN had to work seriously to create a set of indicators and plans.

Moving on to the ASEAN institutional instruments such as the ASEAN Charter and the Post-2025 Vision, the agenda regarding the qualities of the ASEAN Charter had been discussed for quite a long time since it was adopted in 2008. Alexandra stated that Indonesia agreed for the Charter to be established with a specific note that it would have to be reviewed every five years. The document had only been reviewed twice. When certain member states pushed for the review of the Charter, it would create chaos. Alexandra was worried that if the member states agreed to review specific points, they would not review other things, which would be dangerous. Indonesia's purpose to add another task for a high-level task force was to put forward the recommendation on strengthening the ASEAN capacities and institutional effectiveness. Even though the effort was not adequate for reviewing the Charter, it could be an alternative. Indonesian Chairmanship would have to aim high to push the members to review the Charter which had been delayed at least twice. Alternatively, the high-level task force should provide recommendations and strengthen ASEAN capacities and institutional effectiveness.


Another point Alexandra added was regarding the question of how ASEAN could strengthen the role, work, effectiveness, and performance of the Secretary-General to follow up on the leaders' commitment. Something that was missing in the ASEAN Charter was how ASEAN would deal with potential crises, as

Indonesia's capability as a chair

- Some efforts have been done
 - On Myanmar – Quiet diplomacy, Office of the Special Envoy
 - Proposing the HLTF to formulate recommendations on Strengthening ASEAN Capacities and Institutional Effectiveness
 - Declarations on protection of migrant workers, human trafficking, etc
- BUT...
 - Some initiatives can be done at technical level – EV, Village network
 - Should be more substantive
 - On Myanmar – quiet diplomacy, more engagement with more stakeholders in Myanmar but still no significant result – no ceasefire, no implementation plan

the crisis management mechanism had not been included in the Charter. For instance, when ASEAN faced the situation in Myanmar, the only mechanism ASEAN could use was the ASEAN Summit, where the leaders were only scheduled to meet a maximum of twice a year and had to wait for the cycle to discuss the issue. Thus, there was no immediate response taken even though the member states agreed the situation was urgent. In fact, crisis management for ASEAN would deal with urgent and specific situations threatening regional stability and security. ASEAN would need to seriously reflect on what it would mean to be ASEAN and what the purpose of having ASEAN would be. So, there would be an urgent need to maintain ASEAN relevance and credibility to deal with internal and external challenges and ensure ASEAN centrality.

Alexandra hoped ASEAN would come up with significant decisions and find synergy at the 43rd Summit. It would be critical to ensure that ASEAN could remain central and push forward its interests. ASEAN should not be drifted by the interests of big powers and should know how to synergize with major powers as they also would need ASEAN to support ASEAN centrality, such as in the case of ASEAN's leading role in Myanmar, among other things. However, if ASEAN had no idea where it was heading, that was precisely where the danger laid. The big powers would drive ASEAN in whichever direction they would want. Given that Indonesia had been the natural leader, the country should think post-ASEAN and beyond ASEAN. As a big state with its national interest, Indonesia should rethink whether ASEAN would be the only vehicle we have or



whether we can go the other way if ASEAN moved nowhere.


The Post-2025 Vision would be formulated based on the core elements that had been agreed upon to serve as guidelines including action-oriented; sustainable; enterprising, bold, and innovative; adaptable and pro-active; nimble and resilient; inclusive, participatory, and collaborative. There would be a necessity to have as many public consultations as possible to ensure that the Vision would reflect the people's aspirations. Apart from reflecting people's aspirations, the Vision should truly reflect how ASEAN would see the current and foresee future challenges internally and externally and how to navigate and deal with those challenges. Creating a new vision should not simply be a consequence of the expiration of the previous Vision but rather out of the necessity to develop a new guideline on how ASEAN should move forward in the future.

Regarding Timor Leste's new membership in ASEAN, Alexandra recommended ASEAN must provide capacity-building programs for Timor Leste to set itself up as a part of ASEAN. The questions would not only be about how prepared Timor Leste was. Instead, it should also be about how prepared ASEAN would be to accept Timor Leste because it would depend on ASEAN itself, given that the capacity-building would be provided for quite some time.

Furthermore, Alexandra explored extra-regional crises, such as Cross-Strait issues and major powers rivalry. The Cross-Strait issue

was previously raised by the Philippines and discussed in the Retreat but was not in the 42nd ASEAN Summit. The reason was because of different opinions from ASEAN member states on how they should respond to the situation. Some member states may see the issue as a distant regional problem. However, it did not justify ASEAN's avoidance to anticipate something happening in this particular area.

Regarding the relations of different member states with the major powers, some member states are US allies, but some are closer to China. The relations could make some ASEAN countries reluctant to discuss the issue. ASEAN seems to be "complacent"—no clear strategy to anticipate the impact of intensifying major powers' rivalry with the region. It could be seen from the absence of leaders' declarations or statements from the Summit that address this issue. Regardless of the position the member states have towards major powers, ASEAN would need to anticipate the hot spot in the region, have a vision, and prepare specific mechanisms to prevent the impact of this major crisis if it were to break out. It should be the focus for ASEAN because once that already happened, it would be too late. Therefore, ASEAN would need to be more aware and responsive to the potential flashpoints that might impact the region. The main concern would be how ASEAN could respond to particular issues in the future as one entity and not hint at a divided response.



Alexandra assessed Indonesia's capability as a chair by touching on some efforts that have been carried out in the Myanmar Crisis (quiet diplomacy and Office of the Special Envoy), the establishment of the High-Level Task Force on the ASEAN Community Post-2025 Vision (HLTF-ACV), and declarations on the protection of migrant workers and human trafficking. However, some initiatives can be done at a technical level—for instance, electric vehicles (EV) and village networks. Hence, ASEAN should project more substantive issues at the Summit level. Alexandra provided recommendations for Indonesia and ASEAN for the upcoming Summit, such as: (1) issuing an Implementation Plan and institutionalizing the Office of the Special Envoy to be an ASEAN

one, a new strategy to initiate a “minilateral” group to deal with the Myanmar Crisis; (2) discussing major power rivalry and focusing on the big issues such as the South China Sea Code of Conduct and concrete initiatives to implement the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP); and (3) creating a clear timeline and steps for the process to formulate the Post-2025 Vision and the follow-up for the HLTF-ACV recommendations for Strengthening ASEAN's Capacity and Institutional Effectiveness. She closed her speech by stressing that Indonesia as the 2023 ASEAN Chair must focus on the substance, not the celebration.



QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION

Questions

Julia Cheng (Audience from YouTube):

Question for Alexandra, why was there no discussion at the Summit about the Cross-Strait issue? In fact, this differed from the statement from the Retreat in February that mentioned the Cross-Strait issues. What might have contributed to that?

Responses

Lina A. Alexandra (Head of Department of International Relations, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Indonesia):

The reason was that the ASEAN member states had different views on responding to the situation. Some members saw the Cross-Strait issue as an impossible crisis because it was a distant problem from the region. Many analysts believe that China would still conduct rationally in this crisis. However, it could not justify that ASEAN should not anticipate if something were to happen in this particular area.

Regarding the relations of different member states with major powers, it was clear why the Philippines raised the issue. However, since other members must think carefully because they were not US allies and were closer to China, they were reluctant to discuss the issue. Therefore, they differed on whether this issue should be discussed at the Summit. Regardless of member states' position towards the great powers, we would need to anticipate, have a vision, and prepare for specific mechanisms to prevent this major crisis' impact on the region if it were to break out. ASEAN should be more aware and responsive to the potential of the flashpoint that might impact the regions. ASEAN must respond to the issue as one entity, as the members still had different responses that further divided ASEAN.

Questions

Sun (ROK Mission to ASEAN):

How do you see the Post-2025 Vision? Would there be no more Bali concord IV-type of grand vision expected?

Responses

Teuku Rezasyah (Lecturer, Department of International Relations, Universitas Padjadjaran):

In regard to what would happen in 2025, Rezasyah argued that we were dealing with complicated issues amidst global structural changes. After the end of the Cold War, he argued that the international system was a unipolar one, while now it had become a bipolar system involving tight competition between the US and China. Based on the White House document, the US anticipated a possible coalition between China and Russia which had already happened with Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). ASEAN should unify and make ASEAN centrality still relevant. We must keep working on the ASEAN Political-Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community, and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.

Since the world would be uncertain, ASEAN should be worried about the possibility of nuclear war in the future. Also, ASEAN should discuss energy, environment, weapons, and space. ASEAN had a principle called regional resilience which made us integrated as a team, and then we would need to chart more than just ASEAN 2025, even for ASEAN 2050. In fulfilling these goals, Rezasyah suggested making ASEAN more attractive to the rest of the world and the ASEAN members. ASEAN should work on the economic gap between its members. So, before discussing ASEAN 2025, we must do our national homework first.

Makarim Wibisono (Professor, The Republic of Indonesia Defense University):

Mr. Wibisono pointed out that some critical problems should be raised in the Post-2025 Vision, such as pandemics and climate change. Having a position toward major powers would be crucial because of their technology and the capacity to make vaccines. We must have good relations and diplomacy to respond to future pandemic threats.

Lina A. Alexandra (Head of Department of International Relations, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Indonesia):

Adding comments from Mr. Wibisono and Rezasyah, Lina emphasized that formulating the Post-2025 Vision should start from the way ASEAN saw and assessed current and future challenges. It would also be essential to have public engagements during the process in order to make ASEAN a people-centered organization. ASEAN officials must listen and ask about the people's needs, how ASEAN should be, and how ASEAN could be meaningful for them. Alexandra concluded that how reformative vision would be would depend on the process, and the process would determine the result itself.



ABOUT ASEAN STUDIES PROGRAM

The ASEAN Studies Program was established on February 24, 2010, to become a center of excellence on ASEAN related issues, which can assist in the development of the ASEAN Community by 2015. The Habibie Center through its ASEAN Studies Program, alongside other institutions working towards the same goal, hopes to contribute to the realization of a more people-oriented ASEAN that puts a high value on democracy and human rights.

The objective of the ASEAN Studies Program is not merely only to conduct research and discussion within academic and government circles, but also to strengthen public awareness by forming a strong network of civil society in the region that will be able to help spread the ASEAN message. With the establishment of ASEAN Studies Program, The Habibie Center aims to play its part within our capabilities to the ASEAN regional development.

ABOUT TALKING ASEAN

Talking ASEAN is a monthly public dialogue held at The Habibie Center in Jakarta. Covering a wide array of issues related to ASEAN, Talking ASEAN addresses topics of: Economic Integration, Socio-cultural, & Democracy, human rights and regional peace, among others. Featuring local and visiting experts, Talking ASEAN is one of a series of twelve dialogues regularly held each month and open to a target audience consisting of ASEAN officials, foreign ambassadors & diplomats, academics, university students, businesses, and the media.

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