



Discussion Report Talking ASEAN Webinar

on

Air Force Intrusions in the Indo-Pacific Airspace:
Impacts on Regional Peace and Stability
from ASEAN Perspective

Jakarta, November 30th 2021



Introduction

JAKARTA – On Tuesday, 30 November 2021, The Habibie Center convened the Talking ASEAN Webinar entitled “**Air Force Intrusions in the Indo-Pacific Airspace: Impacts on Regional Peace and Stability from ASEAN Perspective.**” Attending as speakers, the webinar invited **Dr. Brendan Mulvaney** (Director of the China Aerospace Studies Institute at National Defense University, Washington D.C.), **Dr. Ian Montratama** (Board of Advisor Member in Defense Diplomacy Strategic Forum and Lecturer at International Relations Department at Pertamina University), and **Liam Gibson** (Founder of Policy People and Reporter at Taiwan News). The discussion was moderated by **Taufan Samudra** (Researcher of ASEAN Studies Program at The Habibie Center).


The objectives of this webinar were to: (a) discuss the recent Chinese military aircraft intrusions to the airspaces in the Indo-Pacific region; (b) analyze the impact that the issue could potentially give on the peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region; (c) analyze the foreseeable impact that the issue could potentially give to stability in the ASEAN region; and (d) identify the viable solutions to maintain peace and stability in the region amidst the issue.

This discussion report summarizes the key points delivered by each speaker as well as the question and answer session at the end of the section.

PRESENTATION FROM THE PANELIST



Brendan Mulvaney
(Director of the China Aerospace
Studies Institute, National Defense
University, Washington D.C.)



Dr. Mulvaney highlighted the context of recent Chinese air intrusion in the East China Sea and Taiwan Straits under the international law regime. The presentation opened by providing an outlook to the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). The term ADIZ was first defined in 1944 at the Chicago Convention of International Civil Aviation and functioned as an area to facilitate early identification of aircraft inbound to a country's territory before they entered the national-territorial airspace.


Several distinctions need to be made in addressing flight through ADIZ. First, while they may overlap, ADIZ does not serve as a country's sovereign territorial space. Second, the presence or absence of ADIZ will not impact the rights, freedom, or responsibility of any entity in the international airspace. Flying through ADIZ without trespassing to the national airspace does not necessitate prior communication. In fact, most ADIZ was unilaterally declared.

Taiwan's ADIZ encompasses mainland China's Fujian Province and the southern part of Zhanjiang Province. While an air flight from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft could technically pass through ADIZ nearly every day, the discussion needs to be specific on how deep and frequent it enters the identification zone. In the context of Taiwan, a "centerline" located at the equidistance of Taiwan Island and the Fujian coast serves as de facto demarcation land that separates two entities.

Although the PLA did not trespass Taiwan's ADIZ from 2011 through 2019, its aircraft and naval aviation began flying across the "centerline" in February 2020. Furthermore, Dr. Mulvaney stated that China's ADIZ overlapping with those of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are ordinary cases. Japan's and South Korea's areas had overlapped China's ADIZ prior to its first declaration in 2013. Again, Dr. Mulvaney reminded the "gray zone" nature of ADIZ.

PLA flights in Taiwan's ADIZ peaked in August 2020 when Health and Human Services Secretary, Alex Azar, made an official visit to Taiwan. The visit was the highest visit from a US official to Taiwan since the switch in Beijing's diplomatic relations in 1979. Since then, the air operations in the area have steadily increased and culminated in the National Day of Taiwan on 4 October 2021. By November, China had flown 985 sorties in total in 2021. The PLA conducted flights through Taiwan's ADIZ nearly every day, with many provocatively crossing the centerline. Dr. Mulvaney noted that both the frequency of flight and the increasing aircraft complexity as the sources of spotlight.

The types of aircraft presented were the typical fighter jet and maritime surveillance, control aircraft, and fighter escorts. PLA aircraft would likely exercise several activities, including communication procedures during their missions, identification and join procedures, gathering intel, and running through switchology. Dr. Mulvaney opined that PLA's flight could be seen as "gray-zone" operations





SPEAKERS

Brendan Mulvaney


Director of the China Aerospace Studies Institute, National Defense University, Washington D.C.



in the air: not necessarily hostile nor crossing the red lines, yet increasing the pressure. The future development of gray-zone operation may include deploying unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and approaching even deeper into national territorial space.


As the PLA expands and improves its capability to become a world-class military in 2049, China likely begins mimicking the United States and the most powerful militaries around. Dr. Mulvaney warned that the East China Sea, Taiwan, and Japan might encompass China's greater ambition. Despite the fact that the 2016 International Tribunal ruled China's territorial claim unconstitutional, China still underwent its island reclamation and militarization project in various sea features in the South China Sea.

The PLA's exercise near Borneo that entered Malaysia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and Flight Information Region in Kota Kinabalu should remind regional countries of the risk of imbalance. Southeast Asian nations cannot build a military that can counterbalance China, and China knows it. Dr. Mulvaney stated that it is important to stand up for international norms and rules against this potential pressure in the future.




Dr. Mulvaney's presentation ended with several recommendations to address the issue. First, regional states should openly report behaviors deemed to contradict international norms. By calling China's behavior destabilizing and unsafe, it could put notice to Beijing that their actions are unacceptable. The report can be done in various media and using different languages to ensure that all states in the region are aware and do not feel isolated. Equally important, these actions need to be carried out collectively. By improving interoperability and working together, everyone can partake in maintaining peace and stability in the region.

PRESENTATION FROM THE PANELIST



Liam Gibson
(Founder, Policy People)



Mr. Gibson discussed the impact of Chinese air incursion on cross-strait relations and regional stability in the Indo-Pacific. His presentation began by highlighting Taiwanese domestic politics amidst of recent events. A public perception poll conducted by Brookings revealed that 79% of the Taiwanese are well aware of the escalating tension. The record-breaking incursion occurred during Taiwan's National Day, which only separated ten days after the National Day of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 2021. The Chinese air force flights set the stage for President Tsai Ing-Wen to assert her leadership and strong posture against the mainland.

Moving to the impact on regional security, Mr. Gibson stated that PLA Air Force intrusion mirrored China's increasing activity in the South China Sea. Like EEZ, the nature of ADIZ serves as a "gray-zone" area where the foreign vessel technically can move across the area without prior permission, as long as it did not trespass the national sovereign territory. These loopholes provide a space for China to employ various strategies such as involving militia and paramilitary groups in the disputed sea territory, as it did at various times to Vietnam and the Philippines.

The strategic location of Taiwan is also essential for providing a gateway to Bashi Strait, connecting China directly to the South China Sea. To break the First Island Chain, the air force operations served as the eye to monitor submarine operations and any suspicious activity in its periphery. Especially

after AUKUS which signaled the increase in maritime activity in the Indo-Pacific.

Later on, Mr. Gibson alarmed the PLA Air Force's threat displayed during the October intrusion. During the event, China conducted nighttime training for the air force squadron. The incursion also signaled the increasing sophistication of China's military technology. The recent flights involved not only fighter jets that were usually deployed during the regular exercise but also the Y-20 aerial refueling aircraft, allowing more prolonged airborne operation while also extending its time and range. Following China's show of strength during the event, the possibility of deploying UAV is also forthcoming. Some analysts believe that the recent incursion would be the perfect place to exercise PLA's cutting-edge military technology.

The implication is that it shows China is increasingly close to pursuing a "strategic air force" which is equipped with an offensive capability and able to protect China's national security objectives. Some analysts even argue that the PLA Air Force can fulfill "strategic service" in the context of Southeast Asia. Military modernization that China had displayed further worsened the imbalance that Southeast Asian countries have against Beijing.

Increasing operations in Taiwan's ADIZ reflects what China could do in other "gray-zone areas" in the South China Sea. These operations can widen the area denial to the country that operates their maritime and aerial activity



SPEAKERS

Liam Gibson

Founder, Policy People/Reporter, Taiwan News



in the surrounding territory. This tactic was illustrated in Whitsun Reef when China reportedly sent maritime militia to harass and effectively deny the Philippines' access to its sea territory.

The presentation ended with recommendations for regional countries in addressing the issue. To mitigate the threat, Mr. Gibson suggested that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) can begin adopting alert systems, bilaterally or unilaterally by like-minded states, to track air incursion as early as possible. In his presentation, he also mentioned the case of China's "disappearing" ships when tracking devices failed to locate the shipping vessel on its traffic route. This case was presumably caused by China's Personal Information Law enacted on 1 November. The law necessitated

companies to receive approval to share their data internationally before leaving China.

The case above illustrates the importance of ensuring information sharing, especially the trade and maritime supply chain. By increasing cooperation in data sharing and real-time updates, possible military activity can be detected and the regional response could be more prudent. Lastly, ASEAN states and other regional countries also must ensure resilience in commercial flight paths. So that in the scenario when miscommunication occurs, safety can be ensured.

PRESENTATION FROM THE PANELIST



Ian Montratama
(Board of Advisory Member of Defense
Diplomacy Strategic Forum/Lecturer at
International Relations Department,
Pertamina University)



SPEAKERS

Ian Montratama

Board of Advisory Member of Defense Diplomacy Strategic Forum/Lecturer at International Relations Department, Pertamina University




Dr. Ian's presentation touched upon the impact of air force intrusion on peace and stability in ASEAN. His presentation opened by contextualizing the discussion on ADIZ. Based on legal perspective, intruding into ADIZ is not considered a violation since the area is not authorized under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS 1982) or other relevant law that stipulates a country's sovereignty. However, the discussion differs from a political perspective where each country has a different perspective based on their relative position.

To be considered a threat, Dr. Ian stated that ADIZ intrusion needs to be addressed specifically. Whether the flight took place in the country's territorial airspace or EEZ, which serves as a gray area for operation,

will get different treatment. Furthermore, the operations' vulnerability lies in the imbalance between two sides, where China's military powers are highly asymmetrical relative to ASEAN member states.

Later on, Dr. Ian reminded that the case of air intrusion was committed by China in Taiwan and many other states in the region. On 31 May 2021, for instance, the PLA Air Force flew over Malaysia's EEZ, however, it did not violate the UNCLOS. In stark contrast, the United States had once violated the national airspace in 2003 during the Bawean accident, when five F-18 combat jets flew over Indonesia's national territory. Again, the discussion depends on what perspectives are being used, legally or politically.



To begin with, a consensus has not been reached upon defining certain acts as air force intrusion. Several areas still do not fall into the category, including whether the air force; (1) flight with no license in territorial airspace outside of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC); (2) flight with license, but in territorial airspace outside of the designated airway; or (3) flight with a license in territorial airspace, but switching off their transponders.

Airspace in the Indo-Pacific is divided into several Flight Information Region (FIR), where ASEAN's FIRs are often delegated to the adjacent countries. For example, Indonesia's Natuna territory to Singapore FIR and Australia's Christmas Island to Jakarta FIR in Indonesia. Even without a license, air force flights can fly above the SLOC, as long as the transponders are turned on.

Moving on to China-ASEAN relations, Dr. Ian viewed that it is important to redress the topic. China is not the only actor that intruded ASEAN air space. The spotlight needs to move beyond China and address other intrusions by other actors such as the United States Air Force and even including intra-ASEAN member states such as Singapore. Dr. Ian brought US aerial intrusion above Bawean in 2003 and Singapore's overlapping territory for military exercise in Riau Islands as examples.


Several points need to be considered to address air intrusion during peacetime, whether the air force intrusion is intended or not; whether its true nature is for reconnaissance or non-offensive; whether it took place above EEZ

or territorial air space; and lastly, the actor who committed the intrusion. In the previous case, it is evident that the United States did not recognize Indonesia's internal waters as national territory. Since the United States is not ratifying the UNCLOS, the United States' flights can be treated as miscommunication. Based on the considerations above, the response may vary from reminder through radio, an interception by air force jets, or directly forcing down the target.

Dr. Ian added that the United States does not view Indonesia as an archipelagic state. It is evidenced by the data based on a CIA factbook that acknowledges only 93.000.000 square km of Indonesia's water as its maritime territory, whereas the Indonesian Navy data encompasses 3.110.000 square km. Indonesia also has a similar problem with neighboring countries such as Malaysia. Malaysia Defense White Book claimed that the Ambalat Block near Borneo belongs to its territory, whereas Jakarta constitutes Indonesia's EEZ.

Dr. Ian argued that South China Sea issues would not become a direct interest to all ASEAN countries, especially Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar. Since the alignment of each member differs towards China, it is expected that ASEAN's response as a whole will be balanced. The consensus mechanism also limits ASEAN's collective response and economic linkage ASEAN shares with China in advance.

China proposed in the South China Sea Code of Conduct and advanced the proposal to



forbid foreign military activity outside of China and ASEAN in the territory to manage the issue. However, Dr. Ian contended that it would further worsen the imbalance between ASEAN states and China. Some states will rationally seek external security assurance to balance China's dominance in the region.

Since varying interests constrain ASEAN's collective stance, Dr. Ian believed that ASEAN's role at best is to avoid any possible conflict. ASEAN still has internal problems that need to be settled even among the members. To end the presentation, Dr. Ian quoted Prof. Leszek Buszysnki, security studies scholar, who wrote that *"China's restraint will be more forthcoming – and potential conflict more manageable – if the dispute is situated in a balance of power context in which the interest and involvement of extra-regional powers are factored into the whole equation"* (emphasis added).



QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION



Questions

Satrio Santoso (Jakarta):

How do you see Chinese military presence in ASEAN territories? Would ASEAN member states be careful when reacting to Chinese presence because their trade and economy to some degree are supported by China, knowing that China is ASEAN's biggest trading partner.

Responses

Liam Gibson (Founder, Policy People; Reporter, Taiwan News):

Assessing ASEAN's collective response will be difficult since ASEAN is very diverse and each member has its respective alignment to Beijing. However, Mr. Gibson observed that economic ties would play a crucial role in cooling down the possible conflict. Member states like Vietnam and the Philippines, especially after the election, may be growing more assertive, yet other members like Malaysia and Indonesia may remain moderate on the issue. Although Indonesia has begun to take a more assertive stance in Natuna, economic rebalance still possibly takes a role in limiting the response. The security outlook surrounding ASEAN has been growing more complex. With the involvement of many countries outside of the region, the path will be increasingly unpredictable.

Ian Montratama (Board of Advisor Member, Defense Diplomacy Strategic Forum; Lecturer, International Relations Department, Pertamina University):

Dr. Ian stated that we need to be critical in assessing Chinese presence. Except in Myanmar, Djibouti, and Sri Lanka, the PLA is not actively present in the ASEAN Member States. Southeast Asian coastal states will not tolerate China's presence, given the threat caused by artificial island-building and violations of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Furthermore, Dr. Ian objected to China's proposal that military vessels from other countries should not be present in the South China Sea. In order to keep the balance and prevent China from becoming the sole power in the region, the South China Sea needs to remain open for foreign vessels.

Questions

Satrio Santoso (Jakarta):

How do you see the ongoing tension between China and Taiwan going forward? Will the refocusing of US presence and the role in the Indo-Pacific, also serves as a big threat for China?

Responses

Liam Gibson (Founder, Policy People; Reporter, Taiwan News):

Mr. Liam stated that a clear path towards de-escalation is yet to be seen. More concerted efforts must be made especially ahead of the Beijing Olympics and the upcoming Chinese Communist Party Conference in 2022. Mr. Gibson anticipated a slow yet sustained pressure towards Taiwan for the upcoming months. As Beijing has done during the past few years, what can come after can become a “new normal” in cross-strait relations. What makes Beijing concerned lately is not the development of military capability by themselves, but diplomatic support that other countries lend to Taiwan, especially Europe. Recently, more countries have become more outspoken and Taiwan is getting stage in many international events, including the Biden’s Summit for Democracy. Taiwan’s policy towards separation is also becoming more ardent, especially after witnessing the failure of the “One Country to Two System” in Hong Kong.

Ian Monratama (Board of Advisor Member, Defense Diplomacy Strategic Forum; Lecturer, International Relations Department, Pertamina University):

From the ASEAN perspective, the consensus has been made from member states that there is only one China. The problem will be when the reunification takes place. Dr. Ian views that issue could be better addressed as domestic politics when the course of the event depends only on the side of Beijing and Taipei.

Questions

Indra Wisnu Wibisono (Jakarta):

Air intrusion is part of China’s psychological warfare against Taiwan to test the Taiwan Air Force’s response defense and create fear and distrust for Taiwan people in their government. What should ASEAN do to prevent something like this from happening in the South China Sea disputed territories in the future? Is it enough to modernize the air force defense system?

Responses

Ian Monratama (Board of Advisor Member, Defense Diplomacy Strategic Forum; Lecturer, International Relations Department, Pertamina University):

The South China Sea is characteristically different from Taiwan because of its distance relative to the biggest Chinese military base in Hainan. To describe the contrast, Dr. Ian used the terms of “tyranny of distance.” ASEAN countries have a better capability to deter China’s air intrusion.

Indonesia, for example, could set up a big radar and air defense system in Natuna Island. Indonesia can also establish its ADIZ in the future with lower costs than the logistics that China needs to spend operating its air force in long distances to Indonesia. Dr. Ian suggested Indonesia should better consider Natuna Island's strategic position, the only big island adjacent to the South China Sea.

Liam Gibson (Founder, Policy People; Reporter, Taiwan News):

Mr. Gibson suggested that like-minded in ASEAN could collaborate to make a platform to share updates regarding incursion and the events that currently happened in the airspace. More importantly, these actions need to be taken together to bring leverage for smaller countries in the region. Regarding their response, it is highly up to each country, yet it will be better if they can collaborate in order to rebalance the power share in the South China Sea.

Questions

Kang (Jakarta):

This May, Chinese military aircraft up to 16 planes entered Malaysia airspace above Malaysia's EEZ. What did other ASEAN countries think? Did it affect the negotiation process of the COC of the South China Sea?

Responses

Ian Monratama (Board of Advisor Member, Defense Diplomacy Strategic Forum; Lecturer, International Relations Department, Pertamina University):

From the perspective of Indonesia's national defense, there is a possibility that China will enter Indonesia's EEZ. However, suppose the analysis is referring to the "gray-zone" tactic. In that case, intrusions will likely have happened in Malaysia and Vietnam beforehand due to Indonesia's geographic location in the southern tip of South China Sea. In the future, Dr. Ian predicted that Indonesia would be better alerted since the intrusions will likely be detected in the Vietnamese or Malaysian airspace first. Despite the distance, recent tensions should be treated as an alarm for Indonesia to accelerate its military modernization.

Questions

Kang (Jakarta):

How can ASEAN work together, probably with Taiwan, to enhance peace and stability in the region? As you may know, the accidents also happened in both Taiwan and ASEAN.

Responses

Liam Gibson (Founder, Policy People; Reporter, Taiwan News):

For years, Taiwan has been strengthening its ties with Southeast Asian countries through the New Southbound Policy. Taiwan hosts many migrant workers coming from the region, contributing to diversity and robustness in their economic relations. “One China Policy” has strained Taiwan to deepen its relations officially, however, there are many “track two” diplomacy methods that could fill the gap, including academic and business exchange. In addition, Mr. Liam recalled the ongoing academic debate on whether Taiwan should relinquish its South China Sea claim during the Kuomintang Regime, which also overlaps with some ASEAN members. In order to have a closer defense alignment with ASEAN member states, notably the claimant states, dropping Taiwan’s claim from its outpost in Pratas and other sea features can be considered.

Ian Montratama (Board of Advisor Member, Defense Diplomacy Strategic Forum; Lecturer, International Relations Department, Pertamina University):

Dr. Ian echoed the view from Mr. Liam that China’s and Taiwan’s South China Sea claims are overlapping. However, Dr. Ian reminded that ASEAN member states still uphold the “One China Policy.” Discussing political and security cooperation with its member states will be proven to be difficult, if not impossible, in the context of challenging China.

Questions

Kang (Jakarta):

In the event of Chinese intrusion in Taiwan’s ADIZ, Taiwan could respond by intercepting or expelling them, even tracking these aircraft. Other than those, does Taiwan have other options or measures to deter Chinese air intrusion?

Responses

Ian Montratama (Board of Advisor Member, Defense Diplomacy Strategic Forum; Lecturer, International Relations Department, Pertamina University):

Dr. Ian concurred that the cross-strait issue remains a sensitive issue for ASEAN. So far, the United States is only among the few countries that can support Taiwan. However, for ASEAN who commits to the “One China Policy” the priority is still to prevent escalation of the conflict and possible war.

Liam Gibson (Founder, Policy People; Reporter, Taiwan News):

If the conflict escalates, Taiwan could utilize its air shield system and arsenals like Hsiung Feng III indigenous missile and Tiangong III anti-ship system. Taiwan has continuously upgraded its military capability, mostly by cooperating with the United States. In advance, Taiwan could pursue other means of deterrence such as indigenous submarine fleet and bringing international assistance to bolster Taiwan’s military capacity, as it recently did in the Keelung Port. Aside from military means, Taiwan can also pursue an economic way of deterrence. Strengthening semiconductor and other innovative edge technology companies increases the cost of full-scale attacks from China. In short, Taiwan can strengthen its military capability and diplomatic outreach to the surrounding countries that are willing to support Taipei, such as Australia and Japan.

Questions

Ovein Chang (Jakarta):

What is the Indonesian government’s or officials’ view on the PLA air incursions into Taiwan’s air space?

Responses

Ian Montratama (Board of Advisor Member, Defense Diplomacy Strategic Forum; Lecturer, International Relations Department, Pertamina University):

Dr. Ian personally believed that the air incursion in Taiwan would not be taken too seriously by Indonesia, considering Jakarta’s commitment to “One China Policy”. As an alternative, Dr. Ian called the issue to be brought into the United Nations Security Council as the primary medium for discussion. If not managed carefully, Taiwan can become the most vulnerable place to trigger war in Asia.

Questions

Ovein Chang (Jakarta):

Does Indonesia have a growing concern over potential similar airspace threat and/or maritime threat from China? as the issue faces other ASEAN Member States.

Responses

Ian Montratama (Board of Advisor Member, Defense Diplomacy Strategic Forum; Lecturer, International Relations Department, Pertamina University):

ASEAN is concerned about air force intrusion that is conducted by every possible party in the region, so the focus should not be limited to China. Due to its geographic distance, any intrusion will enter the Vietnamese and Malaysian airspace before reaching Indonesia in the southern tip. Considering its location, the issue is not the top priority of Indonesia. There are still many other pressing issues, such as black flights and unlicensed flights. Indonesia is still undergoing its military modernization, causing Chinese Air Force issues to remain on the sideline of the priority.

Questions

Satrio Santoso (Jakarta):

What is your take and the implications of Australia's growing presence in ASEAN? Will it help ASEAN counterbalance China or will it make Southeast Asia a future venue of proxy war between great powers like in the Middle East and Northern Africa?

Responses

Ian Montratama (Board of Advisor Member, Defense Diplomacy Strategic Forum; Lecturer, International Relations Department, Pertamina University):

Dr. Ian highlighted the breadth of AUKUS that covered nuclear-power submarines and cooperation in other military technology such as cybersecurity and space. These technologies will be important in responding to the new strategy conducted in "gray-area." The on-going tension in the South China Sea recently put these types of operations into the spotlight in which China is reportedly using militia and paramilitary groups to the disputed territory. Viewing AUKUS from the balance of power perspective, Dr. Ian agreed that AUKUS is needed to balance China's power. Having a like-minded country that stands on ASEAN's back can better ensure the freedom of navigation in

the region.

Liam Gibson (Founder, Policy People; Reporter, Taiwan News):

Similar to Dr. Ian's views, Mr. Liam agreed that Australia's presence brings positive development to security in the region. The AUKUS is more wide-spanning than simply providing Australia with nuclear-powered submarines. However, Mr. Gibson lamented that AUKUS was not accompanied by good communication prior to its announcement, causing negative receptions from some regional countries. While its intent is positive, its diplomatic messaging, unfortunately was not well executed. However, Mr. Gibson believed that Australia and ASEAN will have an increasingly overlapping interest to keep the South China Sea free and open for everyone in the long term. Noting that, he believed that both sides had gone in a positive direction.



ABOUT ASEAN STUDIES PROGRAM

The ASEAN Studies Program was established on February 24, 2010, to become a center of excellence on ASEAN related issues, which can assist in the development of the ASEAN Community by 2015. The Habibie Center through its ASEAN Studies Program, alongside other institutions working towards the same goal, hopes to contribute to the realization of a more people-oriented ASEAN that puts a high value on democracy and human rights.

The objective of the ASEAN Studies Program is not merely only to conduct research and discussion within academic and government circles, but also to strengthen public awareness by forming a strong network of civil society in the region that will be able to help spread the ASEAN message. With the establishment of ASEAN Studies Program, The Habibie Center aims to play its part within our capabilities to the ASEAN regional development.

ABOUT TALKING ASEAN

Talking ASEAN is a monthly public dialogue held at The Habibie Center in Jakarta. Covering a wide array of issues related to ASEAN, Talking ASEAN addresses topics of: Economic Integration, Socio-cultural, & Democracy, human rights and regional peace, among others. Featuring local and visiting experts, Talking ASEAN is one of a series of twelve dialogues regularly held each month and open to a target audience consisting of ASEAN officials, foreign ambassadors & diplomats, academics, university students, businesses, and the media.

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