

## Talking ASEAN

Key Takeaways from the 56<sup>th</sup>  
ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting:  
Reasserting ASEAN Unity?

### SPEAKERS



**Rolliansyah Soemirat**  
Director for ASEAN Political Security  
Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
of the Republic of Indonesia



**Faisal Karim**  
Lecturer, International Relations,  
Binus University



**Muhammad Faizal**  
Research Fellow,  
S. Rajaratnam School of  
International Studies (RSIS)



The Habibie Center

---

## Discussion Report Talking ASEAN

on

---

Key Takeaways from the 56<sup>th</sup> ASEAN  
Foreign Ministers' Meeting:  
Reasserting ASEAN Unity?

Jakarta, July 20<sup>th</sup> 2023



## Introduction

On 20 July 2023, The Habibie Center (THC) convened the Talking ASEAN Seminar entitled “**Key Takeaways from the 56th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting: Reasserting ASEAN Unity?**” The seminar featured **Rolliansyah Soemirat** (Director for ASEAN Political-Security Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia), **Faisal Karim** (Lecturer, International Relations Department, Binus University), and **Muhammad Faizal** (Research Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS))—and was moderated by **Mabda Haerunnisa Fajrilla Sidiq** (Researcher of ASEAN Studies Program, The Habibie Center).


The objectives of the seminar were to: (a) identify key takeaways of the 56th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting; (b) situate the 56th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting within recent geoeconomic and geopolitical dynamics in the region; and (c) map priority issues to be discussed at the 43rd ASEAN Summit.

This discussion report summarized each speaker’s key points and the following questions and answers session.

# PRESENTATION FROM THE PANELIST



**Rolliansyah Soemirat**  
(Director for ASEAN Political Security  
Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
of the Republic of Indonesia)



Rolliansyah Soemirat began his presentation by mentioning the number of important meetings that ASEAN held in the second week of July 2023. While there were 23 ASEAN and partner meetings, and 239 bilateral and six trilateral meetings, several meetings were conducted parallel and held mostly at the ministerial level. These meetings allowed the ASEAN Member States (AMS) to properly discuss recent and future regional developments and challenges and beyond. As he discussed the meetings' outcomes, a joint communique of the 56th AMM was an example of a few comprehensive documents that the AMS had agreed upon. The meeting also took Indonesia's initiative on the ASEAN Maritime Outlook (AMO). This document would become an umbrella for 12 maritime initiatives in the region. Soemirat also conveyed that President Joko Widodo always emphasized that ASEAN should not be a place for a proxy war.

Furthermore, Soemirat highlighted six essential takeaways from the meetings. First, the development of ASEAN Concord IV, which covered the ASEAN Community's post-2025 vision. ASEAN Concord IV would provide guidance for AMS to face current and future challenges. Second, ASEAN was the main contributor to peace and security within and beyond the region. He stressed that ASEAN was still relevant, especially with more than 240 meetings that had been organized with AMS and partners. It could be seen from several initiatives resulting from the meeting, such as the guidelines to accelerate CoC

implementation, the acceleration process of accession to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Statement on The Ballistic Missile Launch on The Korean Peninsula, and the signing of Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) by Saudi Arabia. Third, strengthening ASEAN led-mechanism in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), especially in the preventive diplomacy aspect. ASEAN realized that the ARF had been stuck in the confidence-building measures (CBM) for the last 30 years. Indonesia was eager to remind ASEAN to maximize the ARF's potential to the next stage by strengthening preventive diplomacy. Fourth, it emphasized regional cooperation regarding health infrastructure, energy, food security, and financial security to support Epicentrum of Growth. Fifth, the mainstreaming of the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP) was concrete support from the AMS in the implementation stage. Regardless of how other countries defined the Indo-Pacific, ASEAN had to refer to the document. Sixth, strengthening cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, namely the cooperation between the ASEAN-Pacific Island Forum (PIF) and the ASEAN-Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA).

Soemirat moved on to discuss the Myanmar crisis. From the beginning of Indonesia's chairmanship, some argued that ASEAN was too big to fail to discuss only Myanmar. Nevertheless, during the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), implementation of the

Five-Point Consensus (5PC) emerged as a key priority for ASEAN. ASEAN strived to facilitate discussions involving all stakeholders to promote inclusive dialogue, including representatives from ethnic rebel organizations and various ethnic groups. Additionally, ASEAN also made continuous efforts to provide humanitarian assistance effectively.

To sum up, Soemirat acknowledged the commitment and efforts made by ASEAN, particularly the effort made by the Indonesian government. However, he recognized that the results of these efforts may take time to be visible, and more time would be required to see tangible outcomes.

# PRESENTATION FROM THE PANELIST



**Faisal Karim**  
(Lecturer, International Relations,  
Binus University)



Faisal Karim shared his view on the takeaways from the 56th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Indonesia has consistently exhibited its leadership role within ASEAN. In 2003, under its chairmanship at the 9th ASEAN Summit, Indonesia launched the ASEAN Community, a tripartite framework comprising the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). In 2023, Indonesia's ASEAN Chairmanship emphasized the need for an inclusive and sustainable regional economy, with particular attention to the digital economy.

Karim highlighted four main aspects from the political-security perspective of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting such as AOIP, APSC, expanding cooperation with regional and international organizations, and other major concerns.

Subsequently, Karim moved on to discuss the first main aspect, the AOIP. The meeting explored the potential institutional cooperation between AOIP and dialogue partners on the Indo-Pacific through ASEAN-led mechanisms, such as the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM). This framework would also widen ASEAN's engagement with Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, such as the IORA, and between ASEAN and the PIF. Lastly, the implementation of AOIP focused on economic areas from the infrastructure forum, creative economy forum, youth on digital development

for SDGs, and ASEAN Business and Investment Summit. ASEAN should put a strong emphasis on economic cooperation, especially the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF).

The second aspect was the APSC. The meeting succeeded in establishing four main initiatives in the APSC. First, the ASEAN Plan of Action to Prevent and Counter the Rise of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism. Second, the Concept Paper on the Development of an AMO. AMO could be the way for Indonesia to maintain the importance of its territorial integrity. He shared an example of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, which still had some loopholes, and AMO could allow Indonesia to pressure its national interest regarding this issue. Third, the Establishment of the ASEAN Coast Guard Forum (ACF). Karim viewed that it reflected the way Indonesia tried to demilitarize the South China Sea, and it could be a win-win solution. Lastly, cross-sectoral and cross-pillar coordination to combat illicit activities.

The third aspect that Karim shared was about expanding cooperation with regional and international organizations. ASEAN tried to align its agenda with the global agenda, such as the support for the effective implementation of the Complementarities Roadmap (2020-2025) and the work of the ASEAN Centre for Sustainable Development Studies and Dialogue (ACSDDSD). ASEAN also would be more focused on reaching out to intra-regional cooperation, such as the ASEAN-



Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Framework of Cooperation and Development Partnerships with Chile.

The last aspect was significant concerns regarding the geopolitical tension, such as the South China Sea, developments in the Korean Peninsula, and developments in Myanmar, where 5PC remained the main reference to address the political crisis in Myanmar, the situation in Ukraine, and the Middle East. Karim also shared that ASEAN needs a major overhaul to remain relevant. ASEAN also needed to take the US-China rivalry as the main issue to be managed because each AMS had different views on it. **The trend was AMS relied on China for growth and development** but looked to the US for security and protection against China's hegemony.


Another concern being discussed was the growing militarized region. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam had acquired next-generation fighters, frigates, submarines, anti-ship missiles, and other complex platforms over the past decade or would seek to procure them in the near future. There was an increase in defense expenditure in the region from 2013 to 2022, reaching US\$60.9 billion. However, it was still less than 2% of the GDP. Karim argued that military modernization had been aimed at balancing against China, alongside increased defense ties with the US and its allies.

At the end of his presentation, Karim talked about the challenge of contestations on regional order within **ASEAN that was recognized in the region.** ASEAN adopted hedging as its strategic approach to maintain positive relationships with China and the US and ensure stability in Southeast Asia. However, a concern was that the non-Southeast Asian powers' actions, as seen in security cooperation like AUKUS and Quad, might significantly influence the regional architecture. This raised questions about the sustainability of the hedging strategy. Traditionally, hedging was a tactic employed by more minor powers towards major powers, prompting the question of what ASEAN could bring to the table for its vision beyond 2025.

# PRESENTATION FROM THE PANELIST



**Muhammad Faizal Bin  
Abdul Rahman**  
(Research Fellow, S. Rajaratnam  
School of International Studies (RSIS))



Muhammad Faizal kicked off his presentation with an overview of the 56th AMM. AMM was an important and inclusive platform for multilateralism and finding solutions for regional issues. It showed more inclusivity than other global forums such as G7, Quad, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization. However, developing solutions was more challenging because intra-regional issues often overlapped with great power politics, especially the Myanmar crisis that undermined the ASEAN chairmanship this year. The Myanmar problem was difficult to solve if the Junta reported receiving support from great powers such as China, Russia, or India. Several ASEAN dialogue partners preferred business as usual with the Junta. Besides, there was growing multipolarity, declining confidence in multilateralism, and increasing investments in military power. There was also a divergent understanding of responsible competition and rising risks of conflict in the Indo-Pacific and great power competition in the region.

Faizal shared how external powers would view ASEAN centrality. The external powers could have two different views about ASEAN centrality. First, ASEAN could be viewed as the geographic center in the Indo-Pacific region. Subsequently, the external powers must live with ASEAN to pursue their interests in the Indo-Pacific. Second, they could acknowledge ASEAN

as a main driver and useful in addressing security concerns. Thus, it became necessary for external powers to penetrate ASEAN in their respective spheres of influence. The lack of resources of ASEAN as a provider of public goods, including emerging technology and health, such as vaccine distribution, gave the great powers the opportunity to prioritize their framework (Quad, AUKUS, IPEF, Global Security Initiative) to drive their engagement in the region. Great powers would see ASEAN centrality as useful only if it served their strategic interest. It would be important to emphasize to great powers that ASEAN would work with them as long as it was also helpful for ASEAN's collective interest and did not transgress international law and the UN Charter.

Two takeaways were highlighted by Faizal. Firstly, the South China Sea dispute remained the main issue discussed in the forum. Some parties reflected their disappointment over the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM). However, the forum resulted in an initiative to develop the guidelines for Accelerating the Early Conclusion of CoC. This initiative implied that ASEAN had realized the long delay on the CoC, and it became a key factor of uncertainties and risk of military calculation on the South China Sea. Faizal questioned whether ASEAN and China had the same goals in reality. ASEAN wanted to ease tension, while China used the negotiation to show it was a consequential

and resident power in the region compared to the US while maintaining engagement with ASEAN to grow economic ties. Secondly, technology became crucial for ASEAN. The discussions covered several issues such as the ASEAN digital economy and integration, the great power politics that affect the ASEAN digital agenda where the US and China saw ASEAN as a battleground for market share, and critical and emerging technology became the domain of competition as well as a tool of conflict. Faizal argued that satellite internet is important for defending people and public governance. There was also a lot of discussion between states regarding space technology cooperation. Hence, ASEAN should form a collective position if there is an escalation in space security and diplomacy, particularly between China and the US.

Faizal stated that the world was watching whether AMM and other ASEAN-led forums could deliver more substance. Thus, AMM should be able to raise and move current emerging issues. Lastly, Faizal urged that maintaining the centrality and credibility of ASEAN was like two sides of a coin. In this matter, AMS had to unite its voices and work together with the dialogue partners.



# QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION

## Questions

### Mabda (The Habibie Center):

Thailand's Foreign Affairs Minister, Don Pramudwinai, recently embarked on a series of meetings with Junta officials and Aung San Suu Kyi. Ngurah Swajaya responded positively to these meetings, considering them to be "aligned with Indonesia's approach". However, it is difficult to separate Don Pramudwinai's recent visit from the reports of Thailand's engagement with Junta leaders in informal meetings with some ASEAN leaders, as well as India and China. Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia were reported to have declined attendance. To what extent have these endeavors hardened the divisions among AMS?

## Responses

### Rolliansyah Soemirat (Director for ASEAN Political-Security Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia):

Soemirat argued that from the beginning of 5PC, there were AMS that proposed a robust approach, and there were also AMS that proposed a weak approach toward Myanmar. When AMS agreed on the 5PC, the approaches taken were considered a fairer reflection of the country. The 5PC should be a collective **guidance** or standard for AMS.

### Faisal Karim (Lecturer, International Relations Department, Binus University):

**ASEAN should be more assertive to the Myanmar Junta.** ASEAN must also be more aggressive and proactive in resolving the Myanmar issue.

## Questions

### Mabda (The Habibie Center):

There are certain hotspots that observers believe could become pivotal points in the US-China rivalry, some of which are Taiwan and the South China Sea. In the event of a conflict breaking out between the two, to what extent can we remain hopeful that ASEAN will be able to play a role or, at the very least, avoid being caught or trapped in the middle?

## Responses

### **Muhammad Faizal (Research Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)):**

Faizal reflected on the Shangri-La Dialogue. The US appeared to be strengthening alliances, leaving little room for ASEAN in its strategic considerations, while China mentioned ASEAN more frequently. Therefore, ASEAN should be more mindful of its potential actions and reach out to the major powers on both multilateral and bilateral levels. This reflection emphasizes ASEAN's stance of not wanting to choose sides and Southeast Asia is a zone of peace and neutrality.

## Questions

### **Rio (Universitas Gadjah Mada):**

Question for Faisal Karim and Muhammad Faizal: The Joint Communique serves as a norm-making process. ASEAN still emphasizes the process itself before turning its attention to the ultimate goal that will give meaning to it. This consideration aligns with the responses provided by the speaker earlier. In this context, ASEAN can be viewed as a norm entrepreneur. Would ASEAN consider any outcome of the ongoing processes, such as the CoC, 5PC, or SEANWFZ, as norms?

## Responses

### **Faisal Karim (Lecturer, International Relations Department, Binus University):**

Faisal Karim argued that ASEAN functions as a platform for norm entrepreneurs. This can be observed in how ASEAN establishes its agenda and how effectively that agenda could be convincing enough to get everyone on board. Recognizing ASEAN as a norm entrepreneur platform is contingent upon the degree of activity and efficacy displayed by the member states on that platform. Additionally, he underscored the crucial role and capacity of the chair in convening the forum. Karim pointed out that Indonesia is one of the capable states suited to assume this role.

### **Muhammad Faizal (Research Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)):**

Faizal further stressed that ASEAN's role as a norm entrepreneur holds particular significance, especially in the face of declining trust in multilateralism. He argued that ASEAN could become a beacon of international cooperation and multilateralism for the global community by sustaining this process. ASEAN simply needs to persevere with the process, encouraging our dialogue partners to put these norms into practice earnestly.

## Questions

### Puji Astuti:

Would it be possible for ASEAN to establish a defense pact, or would it be just security cooperation as it is today?

## Responses

### Faisal Karim (Lecturer, International Relations Department, Binus University):

ASEAN was clear about its non-alignment, and it had ADMM, which serves the function of a dialogue platform for defense issues.

### Muhammad Faizal (Research Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)):

The discussion regarding potential establishment of a defense pact has been discussed in various forums. ASEAN operates as a community rather than an alliance. The ADMM has gained increased importance, and AMS should allocate greater efforts to enhance the ADMM platform. This investment enables the maintenance of mutual trust among us. Moreover, Faizal speculated that should we proceed with establishing a defense pact, Western powers would likely view it favorably, interpreting it as ASEAN taking proactive steps to balance external threats. On the other hand, China's response might be negative, as they could perceive it as a shift in ASEAN's approach—transforming into a defense bloc that could constrain China. This could lead to heightened tensions and more assertive responses, particularly concerning disputes like those in the South China Sea.

### Rolliansyah Soemirat (Director for ASEAN Political-Security Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia):

Regarding the possibility of an ASEAN defense pact, as a diplomat, Soemirat thought to say “never say never”. But he could assure that AMS did not intend to go to that stage. Even with the names, it was called the ASEAN Chief of Defence Force Meeting and still under ADMM, not an ASEAN sectoral bodies meeting. It was a clear indication that we did not have any intention to get there.

## Questions

### Musliman:

Does ASEAN have the capability to defend itself against future potential conflicts?

## Responses

### **Muhammad Faizal (Research Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)):**

It all depends on ASEAN's performance in the upcoming years. ASEAN has begun to address the Myanmar issue and other related concerns. Firstly, Laos will take over ASEAN chairmanship next year, and Laos is a country that is close to Myanmar. Will there be a continuity of many good efforts that had been done from the previous chairmanship? If there is a problem with the continuity, it would be difficult to think of a way to manage future challenges in our region. Secondly, what would ASEAN do if it is already Myanmar's chance to take over the chairmanship, especially if the Junta is still in power? What would ASEAN do to manage and respond to some of ASEAN's dialogue partners who find it difficult to engage with ASEAN on various platforms if Myanmar happens to be the chair? Even if, in the next few years, Myanmar becomes a co-coordinator with certain countries on certain issues, how would our partners see and engage with the region? How ASEAN manages different and interrelated issues in the next few years will determine how well ASEAN will be able to manage other internal problems and conflicts that might happen in the future.

### **Rolliansyah Soemirat (Director for ASEAN Political-Security Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia):**

Soemirat urged people to refer to the ASEAN Charter, as it holds a plethora of potential actions. According to Article 7 of the ASEAN Charter, the ASEAN Summit serves as a policy-making body where leaders of AMS possess wide-ranging authority. However, the question arises: Should we await our leaders' ideas or proactively pave the way for them? This becomes particularly pertinent given the current ambiguity, especially when a consensus is not reached. Consensus, as an integral aspect of ASEAN, is consistently emphasized in the Charter. However, it needs a precise definition to avoid constraining ASEAN's intended progress, particularly when the stage should not be held hostage due to a lack of clarity. Prioritizing the enhancement of operational matters in addressing negative issues becomes a focal point for ASEAN. Can ASEAN effectively respond to immediate future challenges if consensus remains rigidly defined? Reflecting on Chapter 8 of the ASEAN Charter concerning potential conflicts and their resolution, alongside the significance of the TAC, holds importance. The TAC establishes a framework not only for AMS but also for partners, ensuring adherence to certain behaviors within the region. While partner nations may behave differently outside our region, they are bound by the agreed-upon social contract upon entering our region. Furthermore, ASEAN and its partners have the 2011 Bali Principles for Mutually Beneficial Relations, which also warrant consideration in navigating these dynamics.

Soemirat also highlighted that ASEAN must consistently strive to maintain a delicate balance between processes and outcomes. He believed that the proper execution of the process would invariably lead to favorable results. The region's dynamics are undergoing rapid changes. Indonesia's Foreign Minister also pointed out that the current global and regional situations hint

at a potential Cold War resurgence. This brought us to the pivotal question of whether AMS will remain steadfast in upholding unity and ASEAN's central role. Given the present circumstances, the unity of ASEAN is facing a trial. Soemirat stressed that any affiliations or engagements with other countries must not come at the expense of ASEAN's unity. He also delved into the issue of ASEAN centrality. He cited the instance of numerous ASEAN-led mechanisms (such as ARF, ADMM, etc.) gradually being influenced by ASEAN partners. While these partners understandably aim to derive maximum benefit from such mechanisms, ASEAN must persist in ensuring it retains control over these ASEAN-led mechanisms. This control should be based on ASEAN's actual requirements.

## Questions

### **Mabda (The Habibie Center):**

Question to Faisal Karim and Muhammad Faizal: What do you think about the ASEAN Chairmanship this year under President Joko Widodo's foreign policy performance?

## Responses

### **Faisal Karim (Lecturer, International Relations Department, Binus University):**

President Joko Widodo's policy priorities, especially on the development of economic cooperation, have always been part of the direction of Indonesia's foreign policy.

### **Muhammad Faizal (Research Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)):**

Faizal shared that the current chairman had achieved more than the previous one. Indonesia's chairmanship under President Joko Widodo has performed commendably in managing internal issues, particularly concerning Myanmar. Notably, there were efforts to direct humanitarian aid **towards** Myanmar. President Joko Widodo also expressed a robust and unequivocal stance that ASEAN should not serve as a battleground for proxy conflicts among major powers. Such a strongly articulated viewpoint was unprecedented and should serve as a guiding principle for future ASEAN chairs.

Faizal found it interesting and impressive that President Joko Widodo extended outreach to Russia and Ukraine to help mitigate the European war issue. This gesture was perceived not merely as an expression of Indonesia's foreign policy but also as a contribution to addressing a broader strategic concern, including economic energy dynamics that impact Southeast Asia. Faizal believed that Indonesia, as the current chair under President Joko Widodo, has undertaken substantial and commendable efforts despite the inevitable imperfections. Considering the circumstances, the accomplishments have been substantial.

## Questions

### **Mabda (The Habibie Center):**

What are the initiatives taken under Indonesia's chairmanship that you would like to see Laos continue?

## Responses

### **Rolliansyah Soemirat (Director for ASEAN Political-Security Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia):**

As we strive for change, it is important to ensure the comprehensive implementation of AOIP across various domains, encompassing not only the economy but also politics. This holistic approach is essential given the prevailing global dynamics. Ultimately, the AMS are the true inhabitants and live in this region. Our enduring presence underscores **the necessity to assert** our authority in articulating our aspirations and determining our course of action within the region.



### **ABOUT ASEAN STUDIES PROGRAM**

The ASEAN Studies Program was established on February 24, 2010, to become a center of excellence on ASEAN related issues, which can assist in the development of the ASEAN Community by 2015. The Habibie Center through its ASEAN Studies Program, alongside other institutions working towards the same goal, hopes to contribute to the realization of a more people-oriented ASEAN that puts a high value on democracy and human rights.

The objective of the ASEAN Studies Program is not merely only to conduct research and discussion within academic and government circles, but also to strengthen public awareness by forming a strong network of civil society in the region that will be able to help spread the ASEAN message. With the establishment of ASEAN Studies Program, The Habibie Center aims to play its part within our capabilities to the ASEAN regional development.

### **ABOUT TALKING ASEAN**

Talking ASEAN is a monthly public dialogue held at The Habibie Center in Jakarta. Covering a wide array of issues related to ASEAN, Talking ASEAN addresses topics of: Economic Integration, Socio-cultural, & Democracy, human rights and regional peace, among others. Featuring local and visiting experts, Talking ASEAN is one of a series of twelve dialogues regularly held each month and open to a target audience consisting of ASEAN officials, foreign ambassadors & diplomats, academics, university students, businesses, and the media.

**PROJECT SUPERVISOR:** Mohammad Hasan Ansori (Executive Director) & Julia Novrita (Director for Program and Development) | **RESEARCHERS:** Marina Ika Sari, Luthfy Ramiz, Herawati, Mabda Haerunnisa Fajrilla Sidiq | **FINANCE & ADMINISTRATION:** Dewi Isma Rikya Ikhsan, M. Sohib | **LAYOUT & DESIGN:** Mayka R. Asnawiyah

### **ASEAN Studies Program - The Habibie Center**

The Habibie Center Building - Jl. Kemang Selatan No.98, Jakarta 12560  
Tel: 62 21 781 7211 | Fax: 62 21 781 7212 | Email: thc@habibiecenter.or.id

 [www.habibiecenter.or.id](http://www.habibiecenter.or.id)

 [facebook.com/habibiecenter](https://facebook.com/habibiecenter)

  @habibiecenter